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Abstract
Testing denotes a set of activities that aim at discovering discrepancies between
actual and intended behaviors of a system. Often, the intended behavior is known
only implicitly, which renders the process of testing unstructured, unmotivated in
its details, and barely reproducible. The use of explicit and executable models to
describe the intended behavior promises to solve these problems. We use an indus-
trial case study—a smart card application—to present a method for automatically
generating test cases from such explicit models. The test cases are used both to
validate the model and verify the actual card.
Key words: Test case generation, smart cards, modeling
languages, CASE.
1 Introduction
Cost-eﬀectively building the right system and building the system right con-
tinue to be the major problems of software and systems development. The
right system is what customers desire; before development, it exists only in
their minds. Unfortunately, these non-explicit requirements—because of their
informal nature—are no suitable grounds for binding contracts. Speciﬁcations
tend to be more formal and more precise; they try to capture the desired be-
havior of a system. The idea is that speciﬁcations serve as a blueprint for
development and, once a system is built, as a reference to show that the sys-
tem conforms to this speciﬁcation, i.e., that it is built right. Two problems
naturally arise: Speciﬁcations are often ambiguous, which, again, is because
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they are not suﬃciently precise. This is true even when systems development
proceeds in close interaction with the customer. Also, it is not immediately
obvious how to check conformance of a system with its speciﬁcation.
To address these issues, we consider the use of explicit and executable
models of a system. Assuming appropriate levels of abstraction, models are
simpliﬁcations of the system, while still being precise and executable. Once a
model is built and validated against the requirements (which, at one point or
another necessarily are informal), it can serve as a system speciﬁcation that
is agreed upon. In principle, models can be used to automatically generate
code; this is, however, not the subject of this paper. Rather, we focus on test
generation, where the model serves as a reference implementation from which
test sequences are generated.
For validation purposes, meaningful I/O sequences are generated. This
requires not only the model of a system but also a test case speciﬁcation.
Roughly, the test case speciﬁcation formalizes a given test purpose. A test
purpose may be functional (“derive a test suite for testing a particular proto-
col”), structural (“derive a test suite that covers all branches”), or stochastic
(“derive a test suite randomly or on the grounds of a given input data distribu-
tion”). Our test case generator then ﬁnds test sequences that satisfy the test
case speciﬁcation. These I/O sequences are execution traces of the model,
and the validity of the outputs must be checked manually. An automated
check could only be done against another model or formal speciﬁcation of the
system; clearly, this shifts the problem but does not solve it.
Once a model is considered valid, we use exactly the same test case gener-
ation technology to derive test suites for the actual system. The diﬀerence is
that since the model is considered to be valid, we can automatically compare
the system’s output with the intended output as given by the traces of the
model. This step requires adaptors that bridge the diﬀerent levels of abstrac-
tion of system and model—after all, models are simpliﬁcations of the system
and not mirror images.
We illustrate this approach with a model of the wireless application pro-
tocol identity module (WIM) for cellular phones [21]. Roughly, this module
takes care of card holder veriﬁcation (PINs and PUKs), of cryptographic op-
erations such as computing digital signatures, enciphering and deciphering,
and of the security related parts of the RSA handshake between the mobile
equipment and some server.
The general approach is depicted in Fig. 1. In a nutshell, the model and a
set of test case speciﬁcations are used to generate a test suite. This test suite is
concretized in order to be applicable to the actual WIM. The model abstracts
from card-speciﬁc data like PINs or keys, and this missing information is
inserted from a separate data source. The concretized input is fed into the
card, and the card’s actual output is compared to the model’s output that
encodes the intended behavior.
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Fig. 1. Model-Based Testing
Contribution
The contribution of the paper is a proof of concept of the test case generation
technology described in earlier work [16,14] and an extension of previous test
generation work in the smart card ﬁeld [17]. The WIM had undergone exten-
sive testing at Giesecke & Devrient and is already being marketed; the goal of
the work presented here is to provide evidence that the structured, automatic,
and reproducible generation of test cases from models is possible and a viable
alternative to current test design methods.
Outline
Section 2 describes the WIM and its model. In Section 3, we present our
approach to test case generation on the grounds of symbolic execution. Some
of the test case speciﬁcations we used for the WIM are exposed. Section 4
describes the test execution environment and shows how the abstract model
and the concrete system can be related one to another. Section 5 provides an
evaluation of the generated test cases. Related work is presented in Section 6,
and Section 7 concludes.
2 The System and its Model
The system considered in this paper is the WAP identity module (WIM),
which is used in the wireless access protocol extension of the GSM [7] standard
for cellular phones to provide transport level security, digital signatures and
in general public key cryptography.
The WIM is deployed as a smart card application. Smart cards are com-
plete one-chip computers with a microprocessor, RAM (currently 256-4096
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Bytes), EEPROM (2-16 KBytes), and ROM (8-64 KBytes) and a simple se-
rial interface for communication with a terminal (ATM, cellular phone).
Often, a dedicated coprocessor for cryptographic operations is also present.
Smart cards are fully programmable, and usually contain a dedicated operat-
ing system for standard functions like card holder veriﬁcation (usually based
on PINs—personal identity numbers) as well as a hierarchic ﬁle system. Smart
cards are frequently employed to hide secret data like private keys, as in the
case of the WIM.
The programming model of a smart card is essentially a command inter-
preter: The card processor reads commands from its input channel (which is
connected to, say, a mobile phone), parses the command and its parameters,
executes the command (which can change the data stored on the card), and
transmits a response over its output channel. Successful execution of a com-
mand can depend on the previous command history (e.g. the user must be
authenticated, keys must be set, ﬁles in the card ﬁle system must have been
opened).
The test generation techniques presented below are based on the model-
ing languages of the CASE tool AutoFocus [9,19]. AutoFocus is a tool
for developing graphical speciﬁcations of embedded systems based on concise
description techniques—loosely related to the notations of UML-RT—and a
simple, formally deﬁned clock-synchronous semantics, which makes it rather
well-suited for the command/response sequences of smart cards.
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Fig. 2. WIM System Structure Diagram
The system structure is speciﬁed as a network of components that are
connected by directed, typed communication channels. Fig. 2 shows a system
structure diagram of the WIM. Commands enter the system at the left side.
They are then classiﬁed and distributed to a number of functional blocks:
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ﬁle system, card holder veriﬁcation (where the various PIN commands are
handled), security environment (where keys, certiﬁcates and other parameters
are stored), security operations (where the various cryptographic operations
are performed). The responses of the functional blocks are gathered, in some
cases buﬀered, and form the output of the WIM itself. The arrows between
the functional blocks show the dataﬂow within the WIM.
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Fig. 3. State Transition Diagram
Component behavior is speciﬁed by state transition diagrams. Fig. 3 shows
the state transition diagram of the security environment component, used to
store keys and other cryptographic parameters for two diﬀerent contexts (one
for transport-level security operations, one for signature-related operations).
In addition to the control states of the state transition diagram, components
can have data states variables. Variable types, message types for the commu-
nication channels, classiﬁcation predicates for messages as well as functions
that transform the data state are speciﬁed in a simple programming language
that is described in detail in [13].
The smart card architecture of Fig. 2 with its recursive structure of func-
tional blocks with three-layers (command classiﬁcation, command execution,
response collection) is not particular to the WIM, but forms a reference archi-
tecture for arbitrary smart card applications. Moreover, hierarchy can be used
not only to further decompose complex blocks (in the WIM, we decomposed
the blocks for card holder veriﬁcation and the cryptographic functions), but
also to compose diﬀerent card applications.
Not only the architecture is reusable: Certain card components, notably
the ﬁle system and the card holder veriﬁcation can be directly reused for mod-
els of other card applications. In fact, card models are better suited for reuse
than the target code on the card itself, as there is no need for optimization in
order to reduce code size.
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3 Test Case Generation
To obtain test cases from the model, we require a test case speciﬁcation. The
choice of this speciﬁcation is crucial, as it characterizes what is to be tested—
it must reﬂect the notion of “good test cases” for a speciﬁc application. In
addition, since testing itself incurs some cost, it is important to concentrate
on a reasonable number of meaningful test sequences, and these test sequences
have to be characterized.
We experimented with all three main classes of test case speciﬁcations—
functional, structural, and stochastic. All classes can be reduced to a search
problem in the computation tree of the model [14]. Functional speciﬁcations
often involve ﬁnding sequences that produce a certain output: Scenarios, de-
scribed themselves as partial I/O sequences can be broken into subsequences
that ﬁt into this pattern. A similar scheme applies to structural test case spec-
iﬁcations where states are to be covered, transitions or sequences of transitions
have to ﬁre, etc. For stochastic test case speciﬁcations, a driver component is
needed that generates inputs with given probabilities—the system’s behavior
between two generated inputs is then ﬁlled in by the test case generator.
Test Case Specifications
This paragraph describes the test case speciﬁcations we considered for the
WIM.
Functional specifications. The WAP standards provide scenarios for some
applications of the WIM, one of which exhibits the steps necessary to compute
a digital signature. This scenario consists of (1) entering the correct PIN, (2)
selecting the correct security environment, (3) setting the private key, and (4)
performing the computation. Certain permutations of this protocol are legal
in the sense that they also lead to a computation of the digital signature. The
test case speciﬁcation consists of a nondeterministic state machine, the driver,
that encodes these legal permutations. In addition, for each state there are
some commands that, according to the speciﬁcation, do not change the status
of the protocol, (e.g. selecting a ﬁle or asking for a random number), and some
commands that can potentially aﬀect the status of the protocol dependent on
the card’s response (e.g., changing the selected security environment). Both
kinds of commands are easily encoded into the driver automaton (Fig. 4).
This means that not only those traces are tested that eventually lead to a
successful computation of the digital signature, but also those that issue the
respective command and are rejected. Composed with the smart card model,
the resulting system can be used to enumerate all traces of a given length.
Structural specifications. Because of the functional decomposition of the
system we can generate tests for each component (functional block) more or
less independently of the others (see [1] for a compositional approach to test
generation). For instance, to test the component for card holder veriﬁcation,
one can decide to exclude ﬁle system commands in order to reduce the search
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Fig. 4. Driver Automaton for Computation of a Digital Signature
space. Additional heuristics include admitting at most two changes of the
security environment or at most one command that changes the state of a
PIN to “Unveriﬁed” once it has been veriﬁed. The test case speciﬁcation then
consists of enumerating all traces up to a given length while certain commands,
command combinations, or state combinations are prohibited.
We also used coverage criteria as test case speciﬁcations ([22] reviews cov-
erage criteria to the end of both measuring the quality of a test suite and
specifying test cases). It is relatively easy to lift these criteria to the level
of models. We experimented with the modiﬁed condition/decision coverage
(MC/DC) commonly used in the avionics ﬁeld. Not surprisingly, we found
that enumerating all sequences does yield a test suite that satisﬁes MC/DC—
the reason is that we chose the maximum length to be large enough. Coverage
criteria can be applied both to the state machines of the WIM model and to
the functional speciﬁcation driver automata (Fig. 4).
In order to document the relationship between a test sequence and the
WIM requirements, we annotated the model with sections of the speciﬁca-
tion documents, and required all these annotations to be covered; this way
we obtained requirements coverage. Conversely, we automatically structured
the test suites generated by other test speciﬁcations w.r.t. the requirements
they covered. This included both covering annotations and an automatically
generated list of all possible command/response pairs.
Stochastic specifications. It has been observed that random testing is not
inferior to partition testing w.r.t. error detection if no increased probability of
errors can be assigned to certain input data partitions [4]. This motivates test
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case speciﬁcations that lead to the randomized generation of all (symbolic) test
sequences up to a certain length (up to some hundred commands); to reduce
the number of sequences generated, we demanded that two test generated
sequences diﬀered at least to a given extent.
Test Sequence Search
Searching the state space is achieved by symbolically executing the model.
To this end, the AutoFocus model is translated into a constraint logic pro-
gramming (CLP) language. The translation scheme takes advantage of the
simple clock-synchronous semantics of AutoFocus; it is described in detail
in [16,14].
In a nutshell, each transition of a bottom level component K—i.e., a com-
ponent equipped with a state machine—is translated into a formula
stepK(σsrc,ι, o, σdst)⇐ guard(ι, σsrc) ∧ assgmt(o, σdst)(1)
indicating that given input ι, the component may proceed from control and
data state σsrc to σdst by outputting o, provided that the transition’s guard
holds true. The successor state is determined by the transition arrow’s desti-
nation and an assignment that updates the component’s data state. Compo-
nents K that are not leaves of the component hierarchy and thus consist of
subcomponents k1, . . . , kn then recursively translate into
stepK(σKsrc,ι
K , oK , σKdst)⇐
n∧
j=1
stepkj(σkjsrc,ι
kj , okj , σ
kj
dst)(2)
where internal channels, i.e., channels that connect subcomponents, are en-
coded as local variables of K and become parts of σKsrc and σ
K
dst , respectively.
Running the resulting program with a logic programming engine then com-
putes the set of all possible execution traces of the model. To reduce the size
of this set, the traces are computed symbolically by means of constraints. For
instance, if a transition guard requires that a value v is read from an input
channel i, the CLP program does not enumerate all possible instantiations of
i, but instead it creates two traces: one for the speciﬁc command, i = v, and
one with a constraint specifying that the input must be diﬀerent from that
value: i = v.
Computing with sets of values rather than single values obviously helps
to reduce the size of the state space. The following additional reduction is
often useful but must be employed with care. Sometimes, one does not want
to visit states twice. One can thus exclude already visited states (or short
subsequences of such states) from the search process. Some care must be taken,
however, to cope with the interplay of depth-ﬁrst search and “prohibited”
states [14].
Test case speciﬁcations are also translated into the CLP language and
added to the program that represents the model. In addition to the methodical
purpose described above, they serve three technical purposes: determining the
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end of the trace enumeration procedure, directing the search, and restricting
the search space.
Before the symbolic execution traces found in this way can be used as
test sequences, they must be instantiated. This can happen at random or
by limit analysis. For example, the command “AskRandom” is used to de-
liver random bytes. Symbolic simulation yields an uninstantiated command
“AskRandom(n)”, where n is a free variable. According to the range of n,
the instantiation strategy binds this variable with values of 0, 1, 254, 255
and additional random values between 1 and 254. In general, this instanti-
ation procedure takes place w.r.t. the above mentioned constraints that are
collected during execution.
Note that we trust the card in the following sense. If the card returns a
status that indicates there are n remaining attempts to verify a PIN, then
we assume that there are indeed n remaining possible attempts. That is, we
assume that the card response corresponds with the card’s internal state.
4 Test Execution
The test sequences generated according to the principles of the previous section
link the WIM model with the WIM implementation on the smart card. For
each command in each test sequence, the card response is compared to the
response predicted by the model.
In the simplest case, if the observed card response diﬀers from the expected
response, the test fails. As usual, it must be checked whether the failure is
caused by an error in the implementation, or by an error in the test case—
in our case, by a modeling error due to a misunderstanding of the informal
requirements.
Unfortunately, this simple comparison cannot be applied to all card com-
mands. The WIM model is a simpliﬁcation of the WIM application, and in
particular does not contain a faithful description of the crypto algorithms used
in the card. To cirumvent this problem, cryptographic command responses are
not predicted by the WIM model, but rather by the test execution framework.
Other commands, such as the random number generator, cannot be tested at
all; here only simple consistency checks are performed during test execution.
Another diﬃculty in applying the generated test cases to the actual WIM
stems from the diﬀerent abstraction levels of card model and the card itself.
Commands and responses in the model are described symbolically; they need
to be translated into concrete byte strings. Conversely, card responses must
be abstracted in order to be compared with the responses predicted by the
card model for the command. This process is depicted in Fig. 5 for a card
command which queries the number of remaining veriﬁcation attempts.
Fig. 5 shows the simplest case of bridging the abstraction levels between
model and smart card. Other card commands are treated somewhat diﬀer-
ently:
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Fig. 5. Concretization and Abstraction
• The model abstracts from the concrete contents of the smart card ﬁle sys-
tem. Thus, the model responses of ﬁle access commands cannot be directly
compared with the responses of the real card. Instead, only the expected
length of the return data is compared.
• The command “AskRandom” already mentioned in Section 3 returns a cer-
tain number of bytes from a (cryptographically secure) random number
generator. Obviously, there is no way for the model to predict these bytes;
again, only the length of the response is checked.
• For cryptography functions, an abstract response is returned by the model
which contains the necessary parameters (keys, certiﬁcates, the data to be
encrypted, decrypted, signed or veriﬁed); it is left to the test framework
outside of the model to verify the correctness of the card response with
respect to these parameters.
Test execution itself is handled by a testing framework written in Python;
this choice was motivated by the ease of accessing smart card communication
libraries written in C and the support for integers of arbitrary length, which are
essential for the implementation of the consistency checks of the cryptography
operations of the WIM.
Given a set of test sequences, the test framework parses each sequence,
sends each command in the sequence via a card terminal to the smart card,
and checks consistency of the card’s response with the expected response in the
sequence; if there is a mismatch, the current sequence is abandoned and testing
resumes with the next sequence. In addition, the framework has extensive
support for logging, tracing and coverage measurements.
Card-speciﬁc data is described in simple conﬁguration ﬁles, which relate
concrete PINs, keys, certiﬁcates and other parameters with symbolic names
used in the model.
5 Evaluation
For each of the main test case speciﬁcation classes—functional, structural and
stochastic—outlined in Section 3, we generated sets of test sequences—all in
all, some 60,000 sequences of varying length. To reduce test execution time, we
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randomly chose only 2-3% of the sequences; they take a comfortable hour to
execute. Table 1 shows some qualitative results of this test set. The columns
describe the test speciﬁcation, the number of sequences used for testing, the
average length of the sequences, the number of mismatches between model
and card responses and the command coverage (the percentage of the com-
mand/response pairs occuring in the model that were indeed executed in the
test sequences). Because of command redundancy in the diﬀerent test sets, the
coverage rate in the summary row is not the sum of the other rows. Note that
command coverage does not exceed 93%. Closer examination of the model
showed that the remaining pairs were linked to unreachable states in the card
model; this implies that the test set was suﬃciently large.
Specification #Seq. ∅ lgth Mism. Cov.
Scenarios, mismatches 41 7 14 60%
Dig. sig. permutations 322 10 0 15%
Security environment 32 38 20 40%
Card holder verification 275 10 10 49%
Model cov. (Depth 5) 312 5 8 42%
Requirements coverage 528 7 32 63%
Summary 1506 8 84 93%
Table 1
Test Result Statistics
As seen in the table, testing revealed a number of mismatches between
model and card responses. The mismatch rate is particularly high in the ﬁrst
row, as it contains a number of manual reproductions of mismatches for re-
view purposes. All situations could be traced back to misinterpretations of
the requirements documents, or in some inconsequential cases to code opti-
mizations in the—experimental version—of the card software. This is not
surprising: The project goal was to deliver a proof of concept for model-based
testing, and the WIM card had undergone intensive testing before.
Nevertheless, examination of the generated test sequences has shown that
they include the situations covered by the hand-written test sequences. The
main area missing from the generated sequences are explicit injection of pro-
tocol errors, such as illegal length bytes, incomplete bit sequences, or timing
errors.
Measurements on the card code itself showed that the generated test se-
quence set had an almost identical coverage to the test sequences (excluding
the sequences dealing with the error situations mentioned above) designed for
the commercial WIM version.
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We do not give any further assessment of the quality of the generated test
suite here. The reason is that it is most diﬃcult to compare two test suites if
the corresponding criteria are not based on syntactic properties such as code
coverage. The main problem is that there is no general notion of the quality
of a test suite.
It is straightforward to extend our technology to handle protocol errors
as well. Even then the test case production cost can be expected to be sub-
stantially lower than for tests produced by the established non-model-based
techniques.
6 Related Work
Test case generation on the grounds of explicit state transition diagrams is,
among others, discussed in [3,18,5]. Our approach diﬀers from that work in
that we do not explicitly build the state space, but rather symbolically execute
the system. Constraints for test case generation are also advocated in [11,12]
the latter of which is also concerned with smart card testing. While conceptu-
ally similar, they seem not to use state storage strategies and the directed ap-
proach which we deem essential for the eﬃciency of symbolic execution. In the
domain of processor validation (see for instance [6,20]), ﬁnite state machines—
possibly automatically abstracted from VHDL code—are commonly used to
generate tests. These approaches do not proﬁt from the advantages of sym-
bolic execution with constraints. Symbolic execution for test case generation
was widely discussed in the Seventies, e.g., [8], but the constraint solver tech-
nology available at that time was not suﬃciently powerful.
The model-based approach enjoys a long tradition in the domain of telecom-
munication protocols. The test programming language TTCN [10], for exam-
ple, is rooted in this domain. There, however, the abstraction levels of model
and implementation do, in general, not diﬀer signiﬁcantly. In TTCN, test
cases are speciﬁed at an abstraction level that is rather close to that of the
implementation. Note that the choice of abstraction levels for the WIM ap-
plication is partly caused by the inadequacy of common modeling languages
for algorithmic details like cryptographic operations.
Another diﬀerence is our notion of test speciﬁcation, which is more abstract
and intensional than that of TTCN. Our hope is that by using generic test
case speciﬁcations such as coverage of the model, of driver automata or of
command/response requirements allows a higher degree of reuse over diﬀerent
card applications.
Testing, of course, is rather limited w.r.t. the properties that can be
checked. It is, for example, doubtful that errors in the implementation of
cryptographic algorithms can be found by testing alone; here correctness ar-
guments will likely have to be based on core reviews and possibly formal
veriﬁcation. The Java Modeling Language [2] is an example of a behavioral
interface speciﬁcation language supported by a number of veriﬁcation tools,
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which can be applied to smart cards implemented in the JavaCard language
subset. It is also possible to generate test cases from JML speciﬁcations, but
in general the use of a single artifact both for implemenation and as a test
oracle is questionable at best.
7 Conclusion
Model-based test case generation has turned out to be a viable alternative
to hand-written tests for smart card applications. With suitable test case
speciﬁcations, it is easy to generate test sequences that cover the requirement
speciﬁcations of the card commands, sequences that cover the model itself,
sequences that permute common scenarios or taint them with additional com-
mands, and sequences that explore limit cases of command parameters.
The use of models makes test generation itself cheap, but it involves ad-
ditional cost in order to construct the model and the test case speciﬁcations.
While there are a number of suitable notations for models (AutoFocus is
but one possibility), for test case speciﬁcations we had to resort to ad hoc rep-
resentations as CLP programs which encode both the test speciﬁcation itself
and some search heuristics. Current work aims to separate these two issues
[14] and to allow composition of test speciﬁcations [15].
However, because of the high degree of reuse possible for both model (be-
cause of the standard architecture and standard functions blocks) and test
case speciﬁcation (because they describe rather abstract test goals), we ex-
pect most of these costs to amortize quickly.
Moreover, building models of a smart card application has intrinsic value:
The need to abstract the textual requirements and to transform them into a
deterministic, complete and executable model leads to an early clariﬁcation
of the requirements. This clariﬁcation is quite important in practice: For
the WIM, the requirements in the standard documents contained a number of
contradictions and ambiguities; we expect this to be no diﬀerent for other card
applications. Obviously, the development of the card software itself can also
beneﬁt from these clariﬁcations, and indeed models can serve as reference also
for the software implementation. In principle, coding could even be automated
by code generators, but then one must be careful not to generate code and test
cases from the same model, as then—apart from possible errors in compilers
or the code generator—the test cases will trivially be satisﬁed.
It remains to be seen whether the beneﬁts of model-based testing can
also be realized in other domains—automotive or avionics control systems
immediately come to mind, as in their domain the use of modeling languages
is already comparatively wide-spread.
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